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ADMIRALTY--CHOICE OF LAW--SHIPOWNER
WITH SUBSTANTIAL BUSINESS CONTACTS IN THE UNITED STATES
IS AN EMPLOYER WITHIN MEANING OF JONES ACT

Plaintiff, a Greek seaman, sought relief in federal
court under the Jones Act1 for injuries suffered aboard
ship while docked in a United States seaport. Defendants,
corporations, 2 controlled by a permanent resident alien of
the United States, 3 contended the Court was without jurisdiction since they were not employers within the meaning
of.the Jones Act and because the contract of employment
with plaintiff provided for the application of Greek law.
The District Court found for the plaintiff.4 The Fifth
Circuit affirmed.5 On certiorari to the United States

1. The Merchant Marine Act of 1920 § 33, 46 U.SoC.
§ 688 (1964), provides: "Any seaman who shall suffer personal
injury in the course of his employment may, at his election,
maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of trial
by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States
modifying or extending the common-law right or remedy in
cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply;
and in case of the death of any seaman as a result of any
such personal injury the personal representative of such
seaman may maintain an action for damages at law with the
right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of
the United States conferring or regulating the right of action
for death in the case of railway employees shall be applicable.
Jurisdiction in such actions shall be under the court of the
district in which the defendent employer resides or in which
his principal office is located."
2. Universal Cargo Carriers Inc., is the Panamanian
corporation owning the ship; Hellenic Lines is the Greek
corporation managing the ship. Both in turn are owned by
Pericules who holds in excess of 95% of the outstanding stock
of each corporation.
3. Pericules has resided in this country since 1945
and achieved permanent resident status in 1953.
4. Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Roditis, 273 F. Supp. 248
(S.D. Ala. 1967) (plaintiff awarded $1,000 for lost wages;
$5,000 for pain and suffering).
5. Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Roditis, 412 F.2d 919 (5th
Cir. 1969).
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Supreme Court, held, affirmed. A shipowner with substantial
business contacts in the United States who receives the
benefits of American citizenship is an "employer" within
the meaning of the Jones Act. Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Roditis,
398 U.S. 306 (1970).
Admiralty law has traditionally allowed recovery by
a seaman from his employer for care and maintenance expenses6
under an implied warranty of a seaworthy vessel. 7 The Jones
Act of 1920 provided a new remedy for seamen: recovery for
negligence of the shipowner or fellow servants. 8 Although
there was no discussion of this particular provision in the
Congressional debates, the Legislature apparently intended
to protect foreign as well as domestic seamen.9 However,
6. "'Maintenance and cure' gives to the seaman, ill or
injured in the service of the ship without willful misbehavior
on his part, wages to the end of the voyage and subsistence,
lodging, and care to the point where the maximum cure
attainable has been reached." 2 M. NORRIS, THE LAW OF SEAMEN
§ 539 (1970).
7. The "Osceola," 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903); see
2 M.NORRIS, supra note 6, ch. 27.
8. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964) was enacted by Congress on
June 5, 1920 as an amendment offered by Senator Jones of
Washington to the Seaman's Act of 1915. 38 Stat. 1164, as
amended, 46 U.S.C. § 569 (1964). At the same time Congress
passed other amendments affecting the merchant marine. These
were grouped under the heading "To provide for the promotion
and maintenance of the American merchant marine

..

H.R. 10378, 66th Cong., 2d Sess. (1920).
9. On May 11, 1920, three days before the Senate adopted
the Jones Act, Senator King of Utah, with reference to another
section of the Seaman's Act, stated:
"It is important that we should have a broad and comprehensive act dealing with this very important subject, one so
vital to American interests and to commercial prosperity and
development of our country; but no matter how important a
measure may be, we cannot afford to incorporate within its
provisions that which may do an injustice, even to aliens, or
those who may be carrying commerce under an alien flag.

149

in applying the statute, courts have been reluctant to follow
the literal words of the Act where its application would
conflict with traditional rules of international law. Thus,
where defendants had registered their vessel in a foreign
country, jurisdiction under the Jones Act was denied because
of the ancient maritime principle that the law of the flag

I think I would be as punctilious in preserving the
rights of a foreigner where there are dealings between
nations, as there must be, as I would be in preserving the
rights of Americans. That is to say, I would afford a full
and fair opportunity for a foreigner to have his rights
determined, and I would not act in a summary way in dealing
with foreigners any more than I would act in a summary way in
dealing with the sights of American citizens."
On May 13, 1920, Senator Jones said, "This does not
pretend, either, to affect those vessels in the ports of a
foreign country. The matter would be governed there by the
laws of the country." 59 CONG. REC. 6994 (1920).
On the day of the Jones Act's adoption, Senator Jones in
discussion of an amendment to the law regulating payment of
half wages in American ports asserted the purpose was "to
bring the foreign seamen up to a level with our own seamen
by giving them the remedy here in our own ports that our
seamen have."
59 CONG. REC. 7036-37 (192). Following this,
he and Senator King discussed the issue of jurisdiction:
"Mr. King. 'Does the Senator say that the Supreme
Court has held that we have jurisdiction over the foreign
seamen and foreign ships?'
Mr. Jones. 'Under the present statute we have such
jurisdiction in our ports.
The Supreme Court held that act to be constitutional
only a short time ago.'
Mr. King. 'A vessel then, that sails under the Norwegian
flag, for instance, with Norwegian sailors, if it touched
at an American port for a day would become subject to the
jurisdiction of our courts and the provisions of this proposed
law, and the sailors could invoke the law for their protection?'
Mr. Jones.
'Yes, while in an American port. It was one
of the main contentions, the Senator from Utah will remember,
in favor of the [Sleaman's [A]ct, that it would instead of
placing a great burden on our seamen and shippers, bring the
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of the vessel was controlling. I 0 Nevertheless, other courts
have found liability despite the law of the flag where the
plaintiff was an American seaman on a ship substantially
owned by Americans; I I where a foreign seaman was aboard
1 2 where
an American owned vessel in United States waters;
13
waters;
American
in
a resident alien seaman was injured
and where a foreign seaman had signed shipping orders in
the United States. 14 Prior to 1953, the cases were decided
on an ad hoc basis, and no standard was developed for proper
application of the Jones Act. In Lauritzen v. Larsen,1 5 a
1953 decision, the Supreme Court formulated the basic test
to determine the extent of jurisdiction under the Jones
Act. The Court suggested seven factors to be balanced
in making this determination: place of the wrongful act;
law of the flag; allegiance or domicile of the injured
seaman; allegiance of the defendant shipowner; place of
contract; inaccessibility of foreign forum; and law of the

wages of the seamen of other countries up to a level with
our own. This provision is intended to aid in carrying out
that great purpose.'" 59 CONG. REC. 6494 (1920). See generally
Harolds, Some Legal Problems Arising Out of Foreign Flag
Operations, 28 FORDHAM L. REV. 295 (1959).
10. La Bourgogne, 210 U.S. 95 (1908); In re Ross 140
U.S. 453 (1891); Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. 1 (1887); The
"Belgenland," 114 U.S. 355 (1885); The "Scotland," 105 U.S.
24 (1881).
11. Carroll v. United States, 113 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1943)
(foreign seaman aboard American ship on the high seas);
Gerradin v. United Fruit Co., 60 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1932)
(American seaman aboard vessel of Honduran registry but
American owned, while on high seas).
12. Torgersen v. Hutton, 267 N.Y. 535, 196 N.E. 566
(1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 602 (1935) (foreign seaman
aboard schooner half-owned by American interests, in American
waters).
13. Gambera v. Bergoty, 132 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1942,
cert. denied, 319 U.S. 742 (resident alien injured aboard
foreign vessel in American waters granted relief).
14. Kyriakos v. Goulandris, 151 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1945)
(2-1 decision; L. Hand, C.J., dissenting); Taylor v. Atlantic
Maritime Co., 179 F.2d 597 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341
U.S. 915 (1951).
15. 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
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forum. These factors were to be considered in light of the
basic American policy in admiralty law, which is the promotion 16
of stability and order in the international maritime community.
However, the balanced interest test, enunciated in Lauritzen,
has proved difficult to apply. As a result, the Supreme Court,
since Lauritzen, has found that a Spanish seaman injured
aboard a Spanish ship in New York Harbor had insufficient contacts with the United States to establish jurisdiction under
the Jones Act. 1 7 Some courts have found that substantial contacts of either party with the United States were sufficient
to overcome the law of the flag. 1 8 In Bartholomew v. Universe
Tankships, Inc.,19 the Second Circuit found the Jones Act
applicable to a Liberian flag ship in which American citizens
held controlling interest in the registered owner and the injury
occurred in American waters. However, in Tsakonites v. Transpacific Carriers Corp.,20 the Second Circuit held that a Greek
seaman injured aboard a Greek ship in Brooklyn Harbor could not
recover under the Jones Act, although the principal shareholder
of the shipowner was a permanent resident alien of the
United States.
In the instant case, the Court found the answer to the
question of whether to apply the Jones Act to be grounded in
the relationship of the defendant employer to the United States.
The Court further found the seven factors articulated in
Lauritzen 2 1 were not an exhaustive list for determining who
was an employer. In addition to the established tests, the
Court added the shipowner's "base of operations" as an

16.
345 U.S. at 582.
17. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358
U.S. 354 (1959).
18. Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 263 F.2d 437
(2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1000 (1954); Voyiatzis
v. National Shipping & Trading Corp., 199 F. Supp. 920 (S.D.N.Y.
1961); Bobolakis v. Compenia Panamena Maritima, 168 F. Supp.
236 (SoD.N.Y. 1958).
See also Southern Cross S.S. Co. v.
Tiripis, 285 F.2d 651 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S.
869 (1961); Pavlou v. Ocean Traders Marine Corp., 211 F. Supp.
320 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
19. 263 F.2d 437 (1959).
20. 368 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
1007 (1967).
21. 345 U.S. 571, 583-92 (1953).
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additional factor. 2 2 The Court reasoned that since the shipowner benefited from the business and citizenship laws of the
United States, 2 3 he also should bear the burden of Jones Act
liability. Although the majority found a numerical listing
of contacts favored the defendant, the Court concluded that
the list of contacts was minor "compared with the real nature
of the operation and a cold objective look at the actual
24 Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting,
. .
operational contacts
indicated that application of the Jones Act was limited by
international comity. He rejected a substantial contacts test
founded solely on the defendant shipowner's connection with the
United States, recognizing that both the plaintiff's and
defendant's contacts should be evaluated. In addition, since
Justice Harlan could find no legislative policy which required
overturning recognized maritime law, he argued that the law
of the flag should control.
In the instant case, the Court granted jurisdiction under
the Jones Act solely on the basis of the defendant's contacts
with the United States. 2 5 In doing so, the Court failed to
consider adequately the relationship of the Jones Act to a
recognized national policy of promoting amicable and workable
commercial relations with foreign countries. 26 The implication

22. 398 U.S. 306, 309 (1970) (the Court intimated that
the list of factors was not exhaustive).
23. The same constitutional protection of due process
accorded citizens is extended to a permanent resident alien.
Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953). See
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (Murphy, J., concurring) (resident alien protected in deportation review which
violated Bill of Rights).
24. 398 U.S. 306, 310 (1970).
25. Judge Waterman also took this position in his dissent
to the Second Circuit's opinion in Tsakonites v. Transpacific
In
Carriers Corp., 368 F.2d 426, 429 (2d Cir. 1966).
Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 263 F.2d 437, 441
(2d Cir. 1969), the court stated, "[tihe decisional process
of arriving at a conclusion on the subject of the application
of the Jones Act involves the ascertainment of the facts or
groups of facts which constitute contacts between the transaction involved in the case and the United States, and then
deciding whether or not they are substantial."
26. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358
U.S. 354, 382 (1959).
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of this decision is that once sufficient contacts of the
defendant are found, the Jones Act will apply, irrespective
of either international rules of law or the contacts of the
plaintiff with the United States. As the dissent points
out, this is a misapplication of the Lauritzen tests which
weighed both the defendant's and the plaintiffs contacts with
the United States in light of a national policy of promoting
recognized rules of international law. By ignoring not only
plaintiff's substantial contacts with Greece but also the
Greek flag of the ship on which plaintiff was injured, the
Court has placed in a secondary position the policy of promoting workable international commercial relations. Rather,
it has put primary emphasis on a policy which favors application of the Jones Act. It is submitted that this change in
emphasis will not "foster amicable and workable commercial
relations," 2 7 but will damage the United States' standing in
the international commercial community by expanding the
number of cases in which the courts will disregard the law
of the flag and apply the Jones Act. The better course would
be to return to the balancedapproach of the Lauritzen case
which would permit the courts to retain rules of international
law when the national interest so requires.

27.

Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 582 (1953).
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